Research

Working Papers

Correlation and Robust Communication among Experts

Job Market Paper, 2026

Multiple experts often observe information that is nearly, but not exactly, common. I study a multi-sender cheap talk model in which correlation determines which message profiles are disciplined by Bayes’ rule. Full revelation can be supported under perfect correlation, but any independent component rules it out. The discontinuity is sharp: once information is even slightly imperfectly correlated, the robust forms of communication that remain are coarse and far from full disclosure. These equilibria can take different asymmetric forms, including partitional and nonpartitional strategies, but they do not approximate full revelation.

Bargaining Power Weights Are Not Portable: Realized Position and Protocol Choice in Supply Chains

With Michael Kopel and Toshiaki Wakabayashi, 2026

Bargaining and Information Architecture in Supply Chains

With Michael Kopel, 2026

Desire-Based Inheritance and Costly Claims

2026

Robust Equilibria in Cheap-Talk Games with Fairly Transparent Motives

With Jan-Henrik Steg, Michael Greinecker, and Christoph Kuzmics, 2024

Revise and Resubmit at Games and Economic Behavior.

Full Revelation via Cheap Talk with a Sender Who Observes an Aggregate State

2024

Objective and Polarized Newspapers in News Feeds

2024

Multi-Sender Cheap Talk with Verification

2024